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VIACOM V. YOUTUBE: AN ERRONEOUS RULING
BASED ON THE OUTMODED DMCA
YouTube is currently the largest video website on the Internet.
Although YouTube is often aware of the existence of infringing videos on
its website, it only takes down such videos when copyright owners notify
YouTube that a specific video is unauthorized. This policy prompted Viacom International to file a one billion dollar copyright infringement lawsuit
against YouTube in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. On June 23, 2007, the court dismissed all charges
against YouTube, holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) shielded the company from liability. This article argues that the
court’s holding was erroneous because it misapplied several ambiguous
provisions in the DMCA at critical junctures of its analysis. This article
therefore proposes legislative amendments to the DMCA, and argues that
the decision must be reversed on appeal in order to adequately protect the
rights of copyright owners.
I. INTRODUCTION
You log on to your Facebook1 account. Your News Feed pops up and
you notice that your best friend just posted a new music video of your favorite band.2 You click the link provided and are redirected to the YouTube website.3 A video starts playing. You watch the entire video, and
several others that are recommended to you by YouTube, but never pause
to think whether these videos were uploaded by their rightful owner. As a
matter of fact, you do not even care who uploaded the videos. You are
simply enjoying the moment. You share this enjoyment with millions of
1. “Facebook is a social networking website” that allows users to create personal profiles,
add other users as “friends,” and exchange messages. Josie Myers, What Is Facebook?,
WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-facebook.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
2. See What is a News Feed?, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=408#!/help/?faq=18898 (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (explaining that the News Feed continuously updates a list of “stories” from users’ friends).
3. See Embed a YouTube Video, YOUTUBE,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=171780 (last visited Feb.
2, 2011) (explaining that YouTube videos can be embedded on sites outside of YouTube such as
social networking sites and blogs).
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others who are able to watch music videos, television series, concerts, and
more, free of charge and at the click of a button. On the other hand, YouTube also enjoys having you and millions of others visit its site because it
derives substantial revenue from advertisers.4 Nonetheless, while this enjoyment seems to be shared by all, one party is often excluded from it. It is
the key party who actually created the enjoyment—the owner of the copyrighted video.
In 2005, Chad Hurley, Steve Chen, and Jawed Karim founded YouTube, Inc.5 Working out of a small office above a pizzeria and a Japanese
restaurant,6 one could hardly imagine that they were designing what has
now become the largest video website on the Internet.7 However, when
Google, Inc. (“Google”) purchased the company for $1.65 billion worth of
Google stock only a year after it was founded,8 the three surely knew they
created something special. While the sum paid may have seemed high for
a newly-emerging company,9 Google executives likely foresaw YouTube’s
enormous success. As of June 2010, it is estimated that approximately
twenty-four hours of video is uploaded onto YouTube every minute, and
the average person spends at least fifteen minutes a day on the YouTube
website.10 Moreover, while it was estimated in October 2009 that YouTube
attracted one billion views per day, by May of 2010, this number had doubled.11 Apparently, one factor that greatly contributed to YouTube’s success was the increasing popularity of online file-sharing during the last two
decades.12
File-sharing is defined as “the practice of distributing or providing ac4. See Broadcast Your Campaign, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/t/advertising_overview (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (discussing that
YouTube sometimes has advertisements accompanying its videos).
5. Mary Bellis, Who Invented YouTube?, ABOUT.COM,
http://inventors.about.com/od/xyzstartinventions/a/YouTube.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
6. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Ready for Its Close-Up: With Google Said to Be a Suitor, YouTube Enters Mainstream, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2006, at D1.
7. See Hulu Continues Ascent in U.S. Online Video Market, Breaking into Top 3 Properties by Videos Viewed for First Time in March, COMSCORE (Apr. 28, 2009),
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2009/4/Hulu_Breaks_Into_Top_3_Vide
o_Properties.
8. Michael Arrington, Google Has Acquired YouTube, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Oct. 9, 2006),
http://techcrunch.com/2006/10/09/google-has-acquired-youtube.
9. See Alfred Hermida, Has Google Paid Too Much for YouTube?, REPORTR.NET (Oct. 9,
2006), http://www.reportr.net/2006/10/09/has-google-paid-too-much-for-youtube.
10. Youtube Statistics—2 Billion Views Per Day, CLEAN CUT MEDIA (June 1, 2010),
http://www.cleancutmedia.com/video/youtube-statistics-2-billion-views-per-day-infographic.
11. Id.
12. See File Sharing Information, ANTISHARING.COM,
http://www.antisharing.com/encyclopedia.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
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cess to digitally stored information, such as computer programs, multimedia (audio, video), documents, or electronic books.”13 Two common
platforms that enable individuals to share their files across the Internet are
“file-hosting websites” and “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”) networks.14 Filehosting websites15 enable users to upload files onto online servers.16 Once
uploaded, these files are stored and assigned a link with a specific Internet
address (“URL”).17 The person who originally uploaded the file (“uploader”) can then share this link with people whom the uploader chooses,
allowing them to view and/or save the uploaded file onto their personal
computers.18 If the files are not set as “private” by the uploader, they become searchable and can also be viewed and/or saved by the public.19
Additionally, Internet users can share files via P2P networks.20 Using
this method, individuals use specific software21 to connect to a central network and search for files located on the computers of other users (“peers”)
also connected to the network.22 Files can then be transferred between the
computers of peers.23 Although P2P networks and file-hosting websites are
competitors, file-hosting websites have become more popular in recent
years.24 The reason for this popularity is that these websites are simpler to
use than P2P networks, they do not require the use of separate software to
connect and download files, and they are almost always free of charge.25
Although file-hosting websites allow users to upload many types of
13. Id.
14. See generally id.
15. See, e.g., 4SHARED, http://www.4shared.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2010); see also
MEGAUPLOAD, http://www.megaupload.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
16. See Sharing Videos, YOUTUBE,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/topic.py?hl=en&topic=16569 (last visited Feb. 13,
2011) (explaining how to upload, share, and view videos).
17. See, e.g., How Do I Download Files From MediaFire?, MEDIAFIRE,
http://support.mediafire.com/index.php?_m=knowledgebase&_a=viewarticle&kbarticleid=8&nav
=0 (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) (stating users can access files from unique URLs provided to the
person who uploaded the file).
18. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, GIGASIZE,
http://www.gigasize.com/page.php?p=how_it_works (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
19. See e.g., id.
20. File Sharing Information, supra note 12.
21. See, e.g., BITTORRENT, http://www.bittorrent.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
22. File Sharing Information, supra note 12.
23. Id.
24. Janko Roettgers, Piracy Beyond P2P: One-Click Hosters, GIGAOM.COM (June 17,
2007, 12:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/video/one-click-hosters.
25. See id.
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files,26 YouTube only permits its users to upload video files.27 However,
YouTube provides one major benefit to its users which many other filehosting websites do not: users can view uploaded videos without the need
to first download them.28 This permits users to view videos instantaneously
and from almost any computer that has Internet access.29 Furthermore, although YouTube requires users to register to its site before allowing them
to upload videos, registration is free and not required to view videos.30 As
a result, YouTube attracts an astonishing number of visitors on a daily basis, which is estimated to be “nearly double the prime-time audience of all
three major U.S. television networks combined.”31 However, the freedom
to use YouTube for the purposes of sharing videos has also led to legal issues concerning copyright infringement.32
YouTube, like other file-hosting websites, is frequently the target of
legal challenges because of illegally uploaded and shared material stored
on its servers.33 Although many file-hosting websites mention in their
Terms of Service that users are only allowed to upload files for which they
retain all ownership rights,34 users often violate these terms by uploading
content that does not belong to them.35 Since YouTube only allows its users to upload video files, copyright infringement occurs when copyrighted
26. See, e.g., RAPIDSHARE, http://www.rapidshare.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2010); see
also MEGAUPLOAD, supra note 15.
27. About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Feb. 20,
2011).
28. Company History, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/company_history (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
29. See generally About YouTube, supra note 27.
30. See Getting Started, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_getting_started (last
visited Feb. 14, 2011).
31. At Five Years, Two Billion Views Per Day and Counting, BROADCASTING
OURSELVES: THE OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG (May 16, 2010), http://youtubeglobal.blogspot.com/2010/05/at-five-years-two-billion-views-per-day.html.
32. See, e.g., Greg Sandoval, YouTube Sued Over Copyright Infringement, CNET NEWS
(July 18, 2006, 5:40 PM), http://news.cnet.com/YouTube-sued-over-copyrightinfringement/2100-1030_3-6095736.html; Premier League to Take Action Against YouTube,
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (May 5, 2007, 11:16 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/2312532/Premier-League-to-take-action-againstYouTube.html [hereinafter Premier League].
33. Copyrighted Content on File Sharing Networks: Encyclopedia, ANTISHARING.COM,
http://www.antisharing.com/Copyrighted_content_on_file_sharing_networks/encyclopedia.htm?s
how_all (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
34. See, e.g., YouTube Terms of Service § 6, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms;
see also MEGAUPLOAD Terms of Service § 3, MEGAUPLOAD,
http://www.megaupload.com/?c=terms.
35. See, e.g., Sandoval, supra note 32; see also Jeff Atwood, YouTube: The Big Copyright Lie, CODING HORROR (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2007/10/youtubethe-big-copyright-lie.html.
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music videos, television shows, commercials, and movies are uploaded
onto YouTube without permission from the copyright owners.36 YouTube
contains a very large amount of such unauthorized content.37 For instance,
a simple search of a popular television show on YouTube often leads to
dozens of copyrighted videos that were uploaded without the copyright
owner’s permission.38 However, despite the large number of unauthorized
videos on its website, YouTube does not independently take down these
videos until it is informed of an infringement by the copyright owners.39
As a result of this practice, YouTube has been a prime target in the global
fight against copyright infringement and has been sued by multiple entities
for copyright infringement based on claims that YouTube knowingly misappropriated their intellectual property.40
The most notable lawsuit against YouTube for copyright infringement
was filed by Viacom International Inc. in 2007.41 Seeking one billion dollars in damages, Viacom alleged that YouTube knowingly and intentionally
allows the exploitation of Viacom’s intellectual property for YouTube’s
own benefit, and that YouTube derives substantial profits via its vast library of unauthorized copyrighted content.42 In essence, the lawsuit raised
the issue of whether YouTube is to be held responsible for independently
monitoring and policing copyright content stored on its site, or whether this
burden should fall on copyright owners.43 On June 23, 2010, Justice Louis
L. Stanton granted YouTube’s motion for summary judgment and held that
the company was protected under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA” or “the Act”).44
Through the lens of the lawsuit and its decision, Part II of this article
provides a background on several copyright infringement theories that
36. See Atwood, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Search results for “south park”, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=south+park&aq=f (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
39. See Atwood, supra note 35.
40. See, e.g., Sandoval, supra note 32; Premier League, supra note 32.
41. See Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google Over YouTube Clips,
CNET NEWS (Mar. 13, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Viacom-sues-Google-over-YouTubeclips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html?tag=mncol;1n (providing a summary of the lawsuit).
42. Id.
43. Viacom v. YouTube, COPYRIGHT WEBSITE,
http://www.benedict.com/Digital/Internet/YouTube/YouTube.aspx (“This is in fact what the crux
of the case is all about—who has the burden of monitoring YouTube . . . YouTube or Viacom?”)
(last visited Feb. 20, 2011) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT WEBSITE].
44. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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served as the basis for Viacom’s claims against YouTube. Part III explores
the arguments made by each party, sets forth the court’s opinion, and points
to multiple errors in its reasoning. Finally, Part IV advocates that Congress
should revise the DMCA to help copyright owners with the burden of protecting their intellectual property.
II. BACKGROUND: THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Legal issues concerning copyright law began with the release of the
printing press, since the new invention allowed for a rapid and widespread
circulation of ideas resulting from the ability to create multiple exact copies
of written work.45 Although copyright law initially applied exclusively to
print material (primarily books), it now applies to a much wider range of
works including maps, paintings, photographs, music, motion pictures, and
computer software.46 Since file-hosting websites often store such copyrighted content, it seems unavoidable that they would find themselves in
the center of litigation.
Such litigation most often begins with § 106 of the Copyright Act.47
While defendants who violate one of the exclusive rights codified in this
section are said to be in “direct infringement,” defendants who do not violate one of these rights may also be found to be in violation of the Act if
they engage in “secondary infringement.”48 However, alleged copyright
infringers could be shielded from liability by § 107 of the Copyright Act49
and/or by the “safe harbor” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA” or “the Act”).50
A. Direct Infringement
An entity commits direct infringement if it is found to have violated
any of the exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner pursuant to § 106
of the Copyright Act.51 Under this section, the copyright owner is given
the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work,” “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,” to distribute copies of
45. HECTOR MACQUEEN, CHARLOTTE WAELDE & GRAEME LAURIE, CONTEMPORARY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 34 (2007).
46. Copyright, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_law (last visited Jan.
24, 2011).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
48. Andrey Spektor, Note, The Viacom Lawsuit: Time to Turn YouTube Off?, 91 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 286, 290, 292 (2009).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see Spektor, supra note 48, at 305.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 106; Spektor, supra note 48, at 290.
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the copyrighted work, and to perform and/or display the copyrighted work
publicly.52 There are two basic elements that must be satisfied to prove direct infringement: ownership and copying of a protectable expression.53
Normally, the requirement to prove ownership of a copyrighted work
is easily satisfied, since all that the copyright owner must do is “introduc[e]
the copyright registration [into] evidence.”54 However, in litigation involving online services, the second requirement is much harder to satisfy because it demands that there “be actual infringing conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying” leading one to conclude
that the online service itself violated the copyright owner’s exclusive
rights.55 More simply put, a plaintiff who brings a direct infringement suit
against an online service like YouTube will have to show that when users
upload and/or view infringing files, the online service’s involvement is so
direct that it is as if the online service itself is engaging in the infringement.56 Since online services do not upload content but simply provide the
mechanism that enables users to do so, direct infringement by an online
service may be difficult to prove.57
In addition, § 107 of the Copyright Act provides a defense against
direct infringement claims, providing that “the fair use of a copyrighted
work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”58 The codified section is
based on Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. Marsh.59 In Folsom, the defendant produced a two-volume biography of George Washington by copying 353 pages from the plaintiff’s twelve-volume version of the biography.60 The plaintiff brought suit for copyright infringement, and the court
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
53. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989); Costar Grp., Inc. v.
Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (D. Md. 2001) [hereinafter Costar I].
54. Mateo Aboy, How Does a Copyright Owner Prove Ownership of a Copyrighted
Work?, MATEO ABOY, PH.D.,
http://www.mateoaboy.com/f6/blog_files/38dd09cd28fda5cab038117b77c8b2b5-16.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2010).
55. Costar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Costar II].
56. Spektor, supra note 48, at 290.
57. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Aimster I]; Costar I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
59. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 560 (2007–2008) (“The language of section 107’s factors was largely
drawn from Justice Joseph Story’s 1841 circuit court opinion in Folsom v. Marsh . . . .”) (citing
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841)).
60. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. at 342–43.
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rejected the defendant’s fair use defense after considering the following
factors: “the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original
work.”61 The codified version of this test now provides that in order to
prove “fair use,” the following factors must be considered: “(1) the purpose and character of the use; . . . (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or the value of the copyrighted work.”62 The fair use defense is
“intended to allow the use of copyright-protected works for commentary,
parody, news reporting, research and education.”63 The defense is supported by the idea that “copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”64
The first factor, “the purpose and character of the use,”65 has two
primary facets: whether the use serves a commercial purpose and whether
the use is transformative.66 In essence, the underlying question of the inquiry into commercial purpose is whether the alleged infringer “stands to
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”67 The transformative facet of the inquiry then asks whether
the work for which the copyrighted content was used added “something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the [copyrighted
work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”68 In other words, to
“promote science and the useful arts,”69 the fair use doctrine provides an
exception for the use of a copyrighted work if the goal of using the work is
to contribute something new to society or to convey a new message to the
world.70
The second factor of the analysis, inquiring into “the nature of the
copyrighted work,”71 recognizes that a work that is creative in nature de61. Id. at 348.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
63. Copyright Basics: Fair Use, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER,
http://www.copyright.com/Services/copyrightoncampus/basics/fairuse.html (last visited Feb. 13,
2011).
64. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
66. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
67. Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
68. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
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serves greater protection against infringement than work that is derivative
or based on facts.72 Thus, the use of a creative copyrighted work weighs
against fair use, while the use of copyrighted work that was created by factual compilation weighs in favor of fair use.73
The third factor in the analysis, “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”74 is also examined by courts to determine if a defendant is protected by the fair use
doctrine.75 Although “there are no absolute rules as to how much of a
copyrighted work may be copied and still considered a fair use,”76 the court
in New Era Publications v. Carol Publishing Group77 gave some clues by
holding that a use is unfair when the material taken is at the “heart” of a
copyrighted work.78 Thus, in order to analyze this third factor, courts will
refer to the portion of the work used by the alleged infringer in order to determine whether it was at the “heart” of the copyrighted work.79
The last factor, “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work”,80 is often regarded as the most important
factor in the analysis.81 To analyze this fourth factor, courts “consider not
only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of
the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market” of the copyrighted work.82 Therefore, courts will analyze the harm that was caused by the specific infringing
actions of the defendant, as well as the negative market impact that may result if the sort of conduct that the defendant engaged in were left unrestricted.

72. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
73. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 348–49.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
75. E.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–89; New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904
F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1990).
76. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986).
77. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 904 F.2d at 152.
78. Id. at 158.
79. Id.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
81. E.g., Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc., 471 U.S. at 566 (finding that the fourth factor of
the analysis is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”); see also Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating the fourth
factor is “widely accepted to be the most important”).
82. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
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B. Secondary Infringement
Adopted from common law principles, secondary infringement theories arose as a result of courts’ acknowledgment that liability for copyright
infringement should also be imposed for the “infringing acts of another
without direct involvement or knowledge of the actual copying.”83 The
concept of secondary infringement liability was first enunciated in Gross v.
Van Dyk Gravure Co.,84 where the court held “the maker, printer, and seller
of an infringing photograph jointly liable for the complainant’s damages.”85
The court supported its decision by stating: “Why all who unite in an infringement are not, under the statute, liable for the damages sustained by
plaintiff, we are unable to see.”86
Currently, there are three common theories of secondary infringement: “contributory infringement,” “vicarious infringement,” and the most
recent theory, known as the “inducement rule.”87 To prove secondary infringement under any of these theories, a plaintiff must first prove that
someone (other than the defendant) “has committed direct infringement and
that the defendant facilitated the infringement.”88 Online services like
YouTube are more likely to be secondary infringers than direct infringers,
because they solely provide a platform that facilitates the distribution of
copyrighted content and do not engage in uploading infringing content
themselves.89
1. Contributory Infringement
Contributory infringement occurs when an entity “with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”90 The Supreme Court has defined a contributory infringer as one who “was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission
from the copyright owner.”91 For example, in A&M Records, Inc. v. Nap83. Spektor, supra note 48, at 292.
84. Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the
Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. REV. 391, 400 n.67
(1995) (citing Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916)) (other citation omitted).
85. Gross, 230 F. at 414.
86. Id.
87. Spektor, supra note 48, at 292.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
90. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971).
91. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984).
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ster, Inc., the district court found that Napster, a creator of P2P file-sharing
software, was liable for contributory infringement.92 The court held that
Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing material was available using its system, that it was able to block access to the system by the
suppliers of the infringing content, and that it failed to remove the unauthorized content even though it had the power to do so.93 In a more recent
case, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant can be liable under contributory infringement if it has knowledge
that infringing materials are available on its system and “can take simple
measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works, yet continues to
provide access to infringing works.”94 Thus, to prove a claim of contributory infringement, the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant had
knowledge of the infringing activity and actively participated in the infringement by inducing, allowing, or contributing to it.
2. Vicarious Infringement
Vicarious infringement, which derives from the tort theory of
respondeat superior,95 is based on the idea that one may be vicariously liable for the acts of another “if he has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”96 The basis for the theory is that “when the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted material—even in the absence of actual knowledge that
the copyright monopoly is being impaired”—the purposes of copyright law
are best effectuated by imposing liability on the person that benefits from
the exploitation.97 Therefore, to be liable under the theory of vicarious liability, a defendant must have a financial interest in the infringement and
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity.
A defendant will have a financial interest when the availability of
infringing material acts as a “draw” for its customers, even if the defendant
92. A&M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
93. Id. at 920–21.
94. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007).
95. “[R]espondeat superior is a basis upon which the legal consequences of one person’s
acts may be attributed to another person. Most often the doctrine applies to acts that have not
been specifically directed by an employer but that are the consequence of inattentiveness or poor
judgment on the part of an employee acting within the job description.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).
96. Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
97. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
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does not derive a financial gain by, for example, charging a fee for its services.98 Courts will then look at different factors to determine whether the
defendant had the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity.99
One such factor is the ability of the defendant to block infringers’ access at
its discretion.100 Another factor is the capacity of the defendant to get hold
of technology that will assist in defending against infringers and in monitoring infringing content.101 In Perfect 10, the court held that the defendant
did not have the power to monitor infringing content, since it did not have
the required technology to compare all the images in the world and “determine whether a certain image on the web infringe[d] someone’s copyright.”102 On the other hand, the court in Napster held that the defendant
did have the ability to supervise an infringing activity simply because it
was capable of locating infringing materials listed on its search indices.103
Judging by the two decisions, it seems that courts are likely to find that a
defendant had the ability to supervise an infringing activity if a simple
search within its system could reveal the infringing content. However, if
minimal effort does not reveal ongoing infringement, the defendant will
likely not be held liable.
3. The Inducement Rule
The inducement rule was articulated by the Supreme Court in MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.104 The rule provides that
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement
by third parties.”105 In Grokster, the defendants developed and distributed
free P2P software that allowed users to exchange electronic files by communicating directly with each other rather than through central servers.106
In return, the defendants generated revenues by selling advertising space.107
98. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that
although Napster did not charge a fee for the use of its services, the fact that the availability of
infringing material acted as a draw for potential users was enough to subject Napster to vicarious
liability).
99. Id. at 1023.
100. Id.
101. See Perfect 10, Inc., 487 F.3d at 731.
102. See id.
103. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1024.
104. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) [hereinafter Grokster].
105. Id. at 936–37.
106. Id. at 919–20.
107. Id. at 926.
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A group of copyright holders brought suit against the defendants, alleging
that they knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable
users to reproduce and distribute copyrighted works.108 The Supreme
Court adopted the inducement rule, previously used in patent law claims,109
and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.110 The Court decided to adopt the new
rule in order to hold defendants accountable for copyright infringement
even if they do not remain directly involved with it, but simply provide a
platform that enables the unlawful exchange of copyrighted content.111 To
find a defendant liable under the inducement rule, the plaintiff would have
to show that the defendant has “provable specific intent to infringe.”112 The
Supreme Court specifically held that “mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. . . . [T]he inducement rule, instead, premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.”113
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act114 (“DMCA” or “the Act”)
was enacted in 1998 with the purpose of “bringing U.S. copyright law
squarely into the digital age” and facilitating the “robust development and
world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research,
development, and education in the digital age.”115 Since the Act seeks to
encourage investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet, its safe harbor provisions limit the liability of Internet service providers for certain acts that could otherwise expose them to copyright infringement liability.116 If an Internet service provider qualifies for any of
the safe harbors enumerated in the DMCA, it becomes immunized from
claims of direct and secondary infringement.117 Section 512(c) of the Act is
the most relevant to online services such as YouTube, providing them with
immunity against copyright infringement claims so long as several re108. Id. at 913.
109. Id. at 936.
110. Grokster, 545 U.S. 941.
111. Spektor, supra note 48, at 300.
112. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 963.
113. Id. at 937.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
115. S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 1–2 (1998).
116. Id. at 8.
117. Mark F. Radcliffe, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Retrospective After
Three Years, 697 PRAC. L. INST. 593, 596 (2002).
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quirements are met.118
First, the defendant must establish that it is a “service provider.”119
The Act defines a service provider as an “entity offering the transmission,
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”120
Second, if the defendant is found to be a service provider, the defendant must show that it lacked actual knowledge of the infringing material on its system121 and awareness “of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent.”122 In cases involving online services, service providers often obtain knowledge and awareness of ongoing infringement by notifications from the copyright owners.123 Nonetheless, even if
service providers are found to have knowledge or awareness, they could
still be shielded by the Act if they act rapidly to eliminate or disable access
to the infringing material.124 As the legislature explained, the DMCA will
not protect service providers that “turn[] a blind eye to ‘red-flags’ of obvious infringement.”125
Third, the service provider must not receive “financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity” if it has the “right and ability to control” that activity.126 Legislative history suggests that service providers
who conduct legitimate business are not considered to have received a financial benefit attributable to the infringing activity.127 However, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,128 the Ninth Circuit held that direct financial benefit exists when “infringing performances enhance the

118. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
119. See Dissecting DMCA §512 Safeharbor Application to User-Generated Content
Websites, TECHNICALLY LEGAL (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.technicallylegal.org/dissecting-dmca§512-safeharbor-application-to-user-generated-content-websites [hereinafter Dissecting DMCA
§ 512].
120. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
123. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914, 915 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (stating the plaintiff attempted to notify service provider of copyright infringement); Costar
I, 164 F. Supp. at 703 (stating the plaintiff sent notification of infringement); Hendrickson v. eBay,
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084–85 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (explaining cease and desist letters were
sent to the service provider to inform of infringement and order to take down infringing content).
124. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
125. H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 57 (1998).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
127. H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 54 (1998).
128. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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attractiveness of the venue to potential customers.”129 Conversely, the district court in Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.,130 refused to apply such a
broad standard, holding that the financial benefit must be derived particularly because of the infringing content.131 Nonetheless, a finding of financial benefit does not bar DMCA protection if the service provider does not
have the “right and ability to control” the infringing activity.132
Courts have also been in disagreement when analyzing this requirement. In Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., the court held that the mere ability of a
service provider to remove or block access to materials posted on its website or stored in its system is not sufficient to prove the right and ability to
control.133 Additionally, the court in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. (“Veoh”)134 held that the power of a service provider to remove
content after it has been uploaded is insufficient to establish the right and
ability to control the infringing activity.135 However, the court in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.136 found that Napster satisfied the “control”
element simply because it reserved to itself the right “to refuse service and
terminate accounts . . . for any reason in Napster’s sole discretion, with or
without cause.”137
Finally, in order to be shielded from liability by the DMCA, the service provider must respond “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity” upon notification of an infringement.138 The DMCA makes
the service provider responsible for designating an agent in charge of receiving notifications of infringement and make available the agent’s contact information in the Copyright Office and the service provider’s website.139 As for the notification itself, the DMCA requires that a notification

129. Id. at 263.
130. Costar I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
131. Id. at 705.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (providing that a service provider is not liable if it “does
not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity”) (emphasis added).
133. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. at 1093–94.
134. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal.
2009) [hereinafter Veoh].
135. Id. at 1112–13.
136. A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1023.
137. Id.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
139. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2).
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of claimed infringement be a written communication.140 This communication must include: (1) “a physical or electronic signature of a person
authorized to act on behalf of the [copyright] owner;”141 (2) a list of the
copyrighted works including the location of the work on the website
claimed to have been infringed;142 and (3) a statement on behalf of the
copyright owner that it has a good faith belief that the “use of the material
in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its
agent, or the law.”143
III. ANALYSIS OF THE VIACOM V. YOUTUBE LITIGATION
A. The Parties’ Arguments
On March 13, 2007, entertainment giant Viacom filed a one billion
dollar copyright infringement lawsuit against YouTube, and its parent
company Google, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.144 Viacom, the owner of numerous television channels
and motion picture labels,145 claimed three counts of direct copyright infringement (public display, performance, and reproduction) and three
counts of secondary copyright infringement (inducement, contributory infringement, and vicarious infringement).146
In its complaint, Viacom argued that YouTube knowingly and intentionally allowed users to upload and view infringing videos on its website.147 Viacom alleged that YouTube chose “not to take reasonable precautions to deter the rampant infringement on its site” because it directly
140. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
141. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
144. Garth Johnston, Viacom Files Federal Copyright Complaint Against YouTube and
Google, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Mar. 13, 2007, 5:51 AM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/108111Viacom_Files_Federal_Copyright_Complaint_Against_YouTube_and_Google.php; COPYRIGHT
WEBSITE, supra note 43.
145. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 7, Viacom Int’l Inc.
v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07 Civ. 2103) [hereinafter
Complaint] (specifying that Viacom’s “television channels and trademarks include MTV, Nickelodeon, VH1, Comedy Central, Logo, MTV2, MTV Tres, Nick at Nite, Noggin, TV Land, CMT,
mtvU, Nickelodeon [sic], The N, and BET.” Also stating that Viacom’s “motion picture labels
include Paramount Pictures, DreamWorks, Paramount Vantage, MTV Films, and Nickelodeon
Films.”).
146. Id. at 18–26.
147. Viacom also pointed out that at the time of the filing, it had “identified more than
150,000 unauthorized clips of their copyrighted programming on YouTube that had been viewed
an astounding 1.5 billion times.” Id. at 3.
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profited from the availability of those videos.148 Viacom sought redress
because it believed that YouTube’s “rampant infringement,” if left unchecked, would threaten Viacom and “other companies that generate creative works” as well as the “livelihoods of those who work in and depend
upon these companies.”149
YouTube filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it was
shielded from all direct and secondary infringement claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA” or “the Act”),150 because it “readily satisfie[d] the [Act’s] threshold conditions for protection under Section
512(c).”151 First, YouTube explained that it is a “service provider” as defined by the DMCA.152 It argued that previous courts have held that
§ 512(c) applies not only to the mere storage of materials, but also to online
file-hosting services.153 YouTube then explained that it had registered a
designated DMCA agent with the Copyright Office to receive notices of
claimed infringement,154 and adopted as well as informed its users about a
termination policy for repeat-infringers.155
Viacom argued that § 512(c) should not immunize YouTube from liability because YouTube did not disable access to Viacom’s copyrighted
videos for which it did not receive DMCA notification.156 However, YouTube argued that it was required to act only when it had knowledge of specific infringement.157 YouTube maintained that Viacom’s own use of
YouTube to upload videos, and its decision to deliberately “leave-up” some
148. Id.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at
20, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 07 Civ. 2103
(LLS), 07 Civ. 3582 (LLS)) [hereinafter Support for Summary Judgment] (“Because YouTube
qualifies for the safe harbor [protections under the DMCA], it is protected against all of plaintiffs’
claims . . . .”).
151. Id. at 21.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘service provider’ means a provider of
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore . . . .”).
153. See Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 28; see also Corbis Corp. v.
Amazon, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110–11 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding that Amazon was protected by § 512(c) for providing a service that allows individuals to upload images to its site,
which are then displayed to users); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp.
2d 1081, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2008) [hereinafter UMG] (“[T]he § 512(c) limitation on liability applies
to service providers whose software performs . . . functions for the purposes of facilitating access
to user-stored material.”).
154. See Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 22.
155. Id. at 23–24.
156. See Complaint, supra note 145, at 15.
157. Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 31–32.
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copyrighted videos, negated any argument that the appearance of Viacom’s
content on the website alone indicated obvious infringing activity.158
Moreover, due to complex licensing schemes and co-ownership arrangements of videos, YouTube argued that without receiving DMCA takedown
notices, it would be nearly impossible to determine whether the presence of
a specific clip on the site is authorized.159 YouTube also argued that it
acted “expeditiously” to remove or block access to videos whenever it received DMCA notifications of infringement.160
Finally, YouTube maintained that it lacked the ability to control the
alleged infringing activity and that it did not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to infringement on its website.161 YouTube alleged that
it had no control over infringing activity despite having the ability to terminate user accounts and remove or block access to uploaded content.162
YouTube added that even if it is found to have the right and ability to control the specific infringing activity, it is still entitled to DMCA protection
because it does not derive direct financial benefit from infringement.163
YouTube supported this argument by explaining that it employs a legitimate business model that generates advertising-based revenue which “in no
way favors infringing material or seeks to benefit from it.”164 It characterized its business model as one that was not dependent on the availability
of infringing videos.165
B. The Decision
On June 23, 2010, Judge Stanton granted YouTube’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that the DMCA protected the company from
all of Viacom’s direct and secondary copyright infringement claims.166
Considering the large amount of damages at stake, and the case’s importance in setting precedent for determining future liability of file-hosting
websites for alleged copyright infringement,167 the court’s opinion, at only
158. Id. at 48.
159. Id. at 51–52.
160. Id. at 55 (“YouTube removes almost all videos identified in a paper, email, or online
DMCA notice within 24 hours or less.”).
161. Id. at 71.
162. Id. at 59.
163. Support for Summary Judgment, supra note 150, at 71.
164. Id. at 78.
165. See id. at 77–78.
166. Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
167. See Scott M. Fulton, III, Viacom Files Landmark Copyright Case Against Google,
YouTube, BETANEWS (Mar. 13, 2007, 12:02 PM), http://www.betanews.com/article/ViacomFiles-Landmark-Copyright-Case-Against-Google-YouTube/1173801741 (classifying the Viacom
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fourteen pages, is surprisingly short.168 Instead of considering in detail
each of Viacom’s claims for copyright infringement, the court simply
stated that the “critical question” in the case was whether the statutory
phrase “actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material
on the system or network is infringing”169 meant a general awareness of
ongoing infringement, or instead meant “actual or constructive knowledge
of specific and identifiable infringement of individual items.”170 The
court’s misinterpretation of the requirements of the DMCA’s safe harbor
protection, and its erroneous conclusion that YouTube could use the
DMCA to counter Viacom’s legitimate infringement claims could substantially harm the rights of copyright owners and must be reversed on appeal.171
1. The Court Erroneously Concluded that General Knowledge of
Infringing Activity Is Not Sufficient to Impose Liability.
Although the issue of knowledge seemed settled after Grokster, when
the Supreme Court stated that it was an “error” to hold that “the specific
knowledge of infringement” was required for liability,172 the Viacom court
decided to follow more recent decisions,173 and held the opposite. The Viacom court stated that “general knowledge that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’
does not impose a duty on the service provider to monitor or search its
service for infringements.”174 The Viacom court felt that a service provider
must remove infringing materials only when it knows of specific instances
case as a “landmark case” and stating that it will “likely determine the future of online video sharing at least, and the Internet media economy at most.”).
168. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
170. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (emphasis added).
171. On August 11, 2010, Viacom filed a request for an appeal in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See Tom Krazit, Viacom to Appeal YouTube
Copyright Decision, CNET NEWS (Aug. 11, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://news.cnet.com/830130684_3-20013337-265.html?tag=mncol;1n.
172. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 (2005)
[hereinafter Grokster].
173. See Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that in
order to find trademark infringement liability, a “service provider must have more than a general
knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is
necessary.”); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099,
1111 (C.D. Cal. 2009) [hereinafter Veoh] (holding that it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to show a
service provider’s general awareness of infringement).
174. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
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of infringement (e.g. by receiving DMCA notifications).175 In essence, the
court ignored § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), which specifically considers general
knowledge of infringement derived from “facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent,”176 or “red flag” knowledge,177 as sufficient to trigger the need to expeditiously remove “or disable access to, the
[infringing] material.”178
The Viacom decision seems to construe
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as meaningless and duplicative of § 512(c)(1)(A)(i),
which requires action when the service provider has “actual knowledge.”179
As a matter of proper statutory construction, the court should have given
meaning to each of the DMCA provisions, instead of ignoring one of them.
Following this narrow lens, the court held that “awareness of pervasive copyright-infringing, however flagrant and blatant, does not impose
liability on the service provider.”180 It added that such awareness “furnishes at most a statistical estimate of the chance any particular posting is
infringing—and that is not a ‘red flag’ marking any particular work.”181 In
essence, the decision provided that the DMCA also protects service providers that turn a blind eye to ongoing mass infringement, requiring that they
only take action when they have direct knowledge of a specific infringement taking place.182 Consequently, the court completely ignored the general rule that willful blindness to wrongdoing proves actual knowledge.183
Further, by giving YouTube and other online enablers of copyright infringement a safe harbor from liability for crimes committed using their
services, the Viacom court erroneously implied that federal law permits
“flagrant” and “blatant” criminal wrongdoing.184
2. The Court Should Not Have Imposed a Knowledge Requirement when
Analyzing Whether YouTube Had the Right and Ability to Control
Ongoing Infringement and when Determining Whether YouTube’s
175. Id.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
177. S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 44 (1998) (“[S]ubsection (c)(1)(A)(ii) can best be described
as a ‘red flag’ test.”).
178. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
179. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief . . . if the service provider . . . does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing.”).
180. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 520.
183. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003).
184. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL
6355911, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Fung] (“In order to obtain safe harbor, a
defendant cannot have knowledge of ongoing infringing activities. This ‘knowledge’ standard is
defined as ‘actual knowledge’ or ‘willful ignorance.’”).
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Revenue Was Directly Attributable to the Alleged Infringing Activity.
The Viacom court also misinterpreted the DMCA’s requirement that
service providers must “not receive a financial benefit directly attributable
to the infringing activity” when they have “the right and ability to control
such activity.”185 In what some believe to be one of the more interesting
holdings in the opinion,186 the court held that “the right and ability to control” an infringing activity “requires knowledge of it, which must be itemspecific.”187 However, § 512(c)(1)(B) makes no mention of a requirement
that the service provider have knowledge of infringement.188 Furthermore,
it is important to note that the language used in § 512(c)(1)(B) resembles
the elements of a vicarious infringement, whereby “knowledge of the infringing activity is not required.”189 Since legislative history has been “far
from dispositive,”190 and courts seem to be in disagreement as to what is
needed for a service provider to have the “right and ability to control,”191 it
is not surprising that the Viacom court added a knowledge requirement to
the provision. Nonetheless, this particular requirement had been explicitly
rejected by other courts for decades.192 Finally, regardless of whether the
service provider has knowledge of item-specific infringement, it is clear
that it has the ability to control infringing activity when it “hosts the in185. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
186. Lisa T. Oratz, YouTube Obtains Summary Judgment in Viacom Case, DIGESTIBLE
LAW (July 12, 2010), http://www.digestiblelaw.com/blog.aspx?entry=1095 (“Perhaps one of the
most interesting holdings in the case . . . is that the ‘right and ability to control the infringing activity’ also requires item-specific knowledge of the activity.”).
187. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
189. Scott A. Zebrak, Viacom v. YouTube: A Missed Opportunity, NATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL (July 26, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463839409&iViacom_v_YouTubei_a_m
issed_opportunity&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
190. Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
191. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084–85 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that the “ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials
posted on its website or stored in its system” is not sufficient to prove it has the “right and ability
to control”). But see, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that the service provider had the right and “ability to control the activities of vendors on the premises” because it reserved to itself the “right to refuse service and terminate accounts”).
192. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that a defendant who had the “right and ability to supervise the infringing activity” would be liable for infringement even if it “has no actual knowledge” of it); see
also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 n.9 (“[V]icarious liability . . . allows imposition of liability . . .
even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement.”).
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fringing material, can remove it, block access to the system and filter incoming works through manual or technological means.”193
The court then had to decide whether YouTube’s revenue, derived
from advertisements displayed on its website, was “directly attributable” to
infringements.194 The court dismissed the issue by referring back to the
control prong and held that a service provider “must know of the particular
case before he can control it . . . . [T]he provider need not monitor or seek
out facts indicating such activity.”195 Consequently, following the court’s
opinion, a service provider could generate revenue by being willfully blind
to ongoing infringement, and still be exempt from liability regardless of
how much infringing material it hosts, how many viewers are attracted by
the infringements, and what percentage of its revenue is directly attributable to the infringements. Moreover, this analysis naturally leads to the
disturbing proposition that service providers are allowed to derive profit
from the unauthorized use of copyrighted content whenever such content
has not yet been identified with “sufficient particularity”196 by someone
other than the service provider. This was surely not the legislature’s intent
when it enacted the DMCA.197
3. The Court Should Have Given More Weight to Similar Litigation
Concerning Peer-to-Peer Networks.
The Viacom court held that case law involving P2P networks had “little application” to the litigation because P2P networks “are not covered by
the safe harbor provisions of . . . § 512(c).”198 This, however, is somewhat
misleading, since P2P networks are almost certainly covered by
§ 512(d),199 which incorporates an almost identical set of requirements that
must be met in order to obtain DMCA safe harbor protection.200 Hence, it
is likely that when P2P networks are not entitled to DMCA protection un193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Zebrak, supra note 189.
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
Id.
Id.
Scott Cleland, Why Viacom Likely Wins Viacom-Google Copyright Appeal, THE
PRECURSOR BLOG (June 25, 2010, 3:34 PM), http://www.precursorblog.com/content/whyviacom-likely-wins-viacom-google-copyright-appeal (explaining that it was never Congress’ intent to provide safe harbor for those who are “willing to steal up until the point that, and as long
as, the party being stolen from does not formally complain of the theft with the ‘actual’ serial
[numbers] of the stolen goods”).
198. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
199. See Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *15–16 (suggesting that distributors of peer-to-peer
file sharing programs can seek protection under § 512(d) safe-harbor for information-location
tools).
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
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der § 512(d), file-hosting websites like YouTube would also not be entitled
to protection under § 512(c) of the Act. For example, in Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. v. Fung,201 the court held that the defendants were not entitled to protection under § 512(d) because they had knowledge of ongoing
infringements, turned a blind eye to these infringements, and did not act
expeditiously to remove infringing material.202 The court supported this
holding by stating that a simple viewing of the defendants’ website would
have revealed that “infringing material was likely to be available,” and that
“overwhelming statistical evidence of the prevalence of copyrighted material available through Defendants’ websites” could certainly lead to the
contention that defendants had knowledge of the infringement.203
Although the Viacom court maintained that Fung had “little application” to the case at bar,204 it could be argued otherwise. Like the defendants in Fung, YouTube could have easily been exposed to the ongoing infringements by a simple search of its website. Following the court’s
analysis in Fung,205 unless YouTube somehow refused to look at its own
webpage, it invariably would have known that (1) infringing material was
likely to be available and (2) most of its users were searching for and viewing infringing material. Furthermore, the fact that YouTube’s own executives knew that an overwhelming percentage of YouTube’s “views” came
from copyrighted materials on their servers206 certainly proves knowledge
using the analysis in Fung. Since § 512(c) and § 512(d) employ the same
basic requirements, and since the facts of Viacom and Fung are similar, the
Viacom court should have found that YouTube was not entitled to DMCA
protection. Moreover, regardless of whether the Viacom court believed that
YouTube was or was not protected under the DMCA, it is clear that Fung
had much more than “little application”207 to the facts of this litigation.
The Viacom court also distinguished the case at bar from other cases
concerning P2P networks by stating that unlike P2P networks, YouTube
201. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911.
202. Id. at *16–17.
203. Id. at *17.
204. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
205. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *17.
206. Viacom’s Memorandum of Law In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos.
07-CV-02103 (LLS), 07-CV-03582 (LLS)) [hereinafter Viacom’s Memorandum] (“YouTube
executives contemporaneously wrote that 70% of their most popular content consisted of copyrighted materials and that ‘the truth of the matter is, probably 75–80% of our views come from
copyrighted material.’”).
207. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
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was shielded from liability for all claims of infringement because it removed infringing material whenever it was given notice to do so.208 The
court essentially held that by merely responding to takedown requests,
YouTube could deliberately allow for piracy of copyrighted works while
being shielded from the legal consequences of its actions.209 Accordingly,
the Viacom court’s logic supports the argument that the defendants in
Grokster and Fung, along with other architects of intentional mass piracy,
could have enjoyed DMCA safe harbor protection by simply responding to
takedown notices—even if they continued enabling and encouraging mass
piracy using their systems.210 Adopting such a proposition would surely
lead to a giant loophole in copyright law.211 Service providers would be
encouraged to condone copyright infringement with the purpose of financial gain, while enjoying shelter from liability by simply removing only the
copyrighted works for which takedown notices are given.212 Such an outcome would lead to the destabilization of current copyright law.213
4. YouTube Should Not Have Qualified for DMCA Protection Under
§ 512(c) Because It Does Not Solely Store Content.
Like the plaintiff in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.
(“UMG”),214 Viacom alleged that YouTube fell outside the protection of
§ 512(c), because its infringing conduct did not occur solely “by reason of
the storage at the direction of the user.”215 It argued that the overall structure of § 512(c) demonstrates that the protection is available only when a
service provider acts as “passive storage provider.”216 Since YouTube “actively operate[s] the website as an entertainment destination with copyrighted material to draw on audience,” Viacom argued that YouTube was

208. Id. at 526 (“[I]t is uncontroverted that when YouTube was given the notices, it removed the material. It is thus protected ‘from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious
and contributory infringement’ . . . .”).
209. Zebrak, supra note 189.
210. For example, the opinion would hold that if the distributors of the LimeWire P2P
software had responded to takedown notices, they would have been protected by the DMCA despite knowing that 98.8% of the files exchanged through their program were likely to be unauthorized. See generally Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
211. Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 33.
212. See generally id. at 34–45.
213. See generally id.
214. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087–88
(C.D. Cal. 2008) [hereinafter UMG].
215. Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 42; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
216. Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 42.
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not a storage provider.217 Additionally, Viacom argued that the infringing
content found on YouTube was not carried out “at the direction of the
user,” because YouTube distributed infringing videos “over third-party
platforms like cell phones and televisions pursuant to commercial syndication agreements negotiated by Defendants, not their users.”218 Nonetheless,
following the logic in UMG, the court rejected Viacom’s claim by holding
that it confined “the word ‘storage’ too narrowly to meet the statute’s purpose.”219 The court explained that the “provision of such services, access,
and operation of facilities are within the safe harbor when they flow from
the material’s placement on the provider’s system or network . . .”220 and
that YouTube falls within the definition of a “service provider” as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications.”221 Other recent decisions have similarly held
that an entity that provides means of facilitating user access to material on
its site is still entitled to safe harbor protection.222
Nonetheless, the issue is whether previous courts223 and the court
here correctly held that § 512(c) was enacted with the intent of protecting
mass media websites that build a business around the transmission of copyrighted content. Legislative history shows that the DMCA was enacted
with the purpose of protecting service providers that legitimately provide
the tools to “facilitate making available quickly and conveniently via the
Internet the movies, music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of
American creative genius.”224 However, the courts seem to have given the
word “storage” an overly broad connotation. The courts’ holdings suggest
that § 512(c) not only applies to storage providers who make content
“available” on their own systems but also to providers who base their entire
business on commercializing stored content on others’ systems.225 Defining content storage to also include displaying, copying, and transmitting
works for the purpose of making profit is too broad an interpretation of legislative intent.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 44.
219. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
220. Id.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A); see also Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
222. See, e.g., Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); see also, e.g., UMG, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
223. See, e.g., UMG, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91.
224. S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 8 (1998).
225. Zebrak, supra note 189.
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5. YouTube Does Not Satisfy the § 512(c) Requirement of Having an
Adequate Repeat-infringer Policy.
In its opinion, the court addressed Viacom’s claims concerning the
manner in which YouTube treated infringers and the way in which it dealt
with DMCA takedown notices sent by copyright owners.226 YouTube
adopted a “three strikes” policy whereby it terminated users after three
warnings arising from DMCA takedown notices.227 However, Viacom
claimed that this policy was not “reasonably implemented” as required by
§ 512(i)(1)(A)228 because of the way YouTube counted strikes.229 YouTube counted as only one strike both a single DMCA takedown notice
identifying multiple infringing videos, and multiple takedown notices of
infringing videos by a single user submitted within a two-hour period.230
Moreover, YouTube used the Audible Magic fingerprinting tool, which
automatically identified a copyrighted video if it matched some portion of
it to a “reference” video submitted by the copyright owner.231 However, it
did not assign a strike to a user when Audible Magic identified a video as
infringing.232
Nonetheless, the Viacom court approved all aspects of YouTube’s repeat-infringer policy.233 The court relied primarily on UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. (“Veoh”),234 where a district court upheld a
“two strike” policy, even when a takedown notice listing multiple infringements resulted in only one strike.235 The Viacom court followed the
Veoh court’s logic that Congress did not adopt specific provisions when defining a user policy, because it wanted to leave the policy requirements of
service providers “loosely defined.”236 Additionally, the Viacom court followed the Veoh court’s holding that the Audible Magic tool “does not meet
the standard of reliability and verifiability required by the Ninth Circuit in
226. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527–29.
227. Id. at 527.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (“The limitations on liability established by this section
shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers
and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.”).
229. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
230. Id. at 527–28.
231. Id. at 528.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 527–28.
234. Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099.
235. Id. at 1116–18.
236. Id. at 1118.

2011]

VIACOM V. YOUTUBE: AN ERRONEOUS RULING

127

order to justify terminating a user’s account,”237 since there is no way of
determining the tool’s accuracy.238
However, the Viacom court seems to have misinterpreted the DMCA
provisions once again, deciding in a manner that unreasonably hurts the
rights of copyright owners. First, the court approved YouTube’s policy of
assigning only one strike to an individual that uploaded a large number of
infringing videos,239 although § 512 provides no basis for such a holding.240
Thus, the decision leads to an undesirable situation where a user could upload thousands of infringing videos over a long period of time, and be assigned only one strike if YouTube learns of the infringement through a single notice, or multiple notices received within a two-hour period. In
essence, such an individual will be treated in the same manner as an innocent individual who mistakenly uploads one infringing video. A policy
leading to such an outcome could hardly be described as “reasonably implemented.”241 Although Congress chose not to define the term “repeat infringer,”242 it seems that an individual who uploads a large amount of infringing videos over a long period of time would surely fit under the
principle that an individual “who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse[s his or
her] access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property
rights of others should know that there is a realistic threat of losing that access.”243 Such an individual should surely have his account terminated, regardless of how the infringement was reported to the service provider.
Furthermore, although the Viacom court relied heavily on the Veoh
court’s decision, the facts of the cases are distinguishable. The defendant
in Veoh had a more aggressive and stringent repeat-infringer policy than
YouTube.244 Although Veoh also assigned a single strike for a takedown
notice listing multiple infringements, it terminated a user’s account and
disabled all of the user’s content if the user uploaded infringing content a
second time.245 By allowing YouTube’s more lenient policy to fall under
237. Id. at 1116.
238. Id. at 1118.
239. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527–28.
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
241. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
242. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
243. H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998).
244. See Io Grp., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1137–38.
245. Id. at 1143 (“When Veoh receives notice that a user has uploaded infringing content
after a first warning, then the account is terminated, all content provided by that user is disabled . . . and the user’s email address is blocked so that a new account cannot be opened with
that same address.”).
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the definition of “reasonably implemented,” the court opened the door for
file-hosting websites to arbitrarily enact lenient repeat-infringer policies
that purposely give infringing users multiple chances to upload unauthorized content, while still comporting with the DMCA. Websites are likely
to abuse this freedom because they derive profit by having copyrighted
content serve as a draw for users,246 and thus, surely enjoy a delay in terminating infringers’ accounts. Hence, although the court in Veoh may have
accurately determined that a policy of terminating a user’s account after
two strikes was reasonable,247 the Viacom court should not have held that a
more lenient policy, that allowing for three strikes prior to termination, was
also reasonable.
The court also approved YouTube’s policy of not assigning strikes to
a user whose video was detected by the Audible Magic fingerprinting
tool.248 Audible Magic is a creator of a tool that automatically scans useruploaded media files and identifies infringements by matching some portion of the uploaded videos against a database of copyrighted videos submitted by the copyright owner.249 The tool is now used by a large number
of file-hosting websites.250 Although YouTube currently employs a similar
in-house fingerprinting technology called Content ID,251 Viacom’s allegations concerned YouTube’s earlier use of Audible Magic.252 Specifically,
Viacom alleged that for approximately six months in 2007, YouTube implemented a policy of not assigning copyright strikes to users who uploaded tens of thousands of infringing clips that were blocked by YouTube’s fingerprinting tool.253 Furthermore, Viacom argued that YouTube
deliberately concealed this policy from the public to avoid criticism by
copyright owners.254
In responding to the issue, the court quickly dismissed Viacom’s argument by holding that YouTube’s initial hesitation in counting these
strikes was reasonable, because “the six month delay was needed to monitor the system’s use by rights-holders, and for engineering work to assure
246. See generally Broache & Sandoval, supra note 41.
247. See generally Io Grp., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132.
248. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
249. See Technology Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC,
http://www.audiblemagic.com/technology.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
250. See Customers Content Identification, AUDIBLE MAGIC,
http://www.audiblemagic.com/customers-contentid.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
251. See Audio ID and Video ID, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last
visited Jan. 10, 2011).
252. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
253. Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 47.
254. Id.

2011]

VIACOM V. YOUTUBE: AN ERRONEOUS RULING

129

that strikes would be assigned accurately.”255 However, the court apparently ignored the fact that YouTube’s hesitation resulted in thousands of
videos being uploaded by users who were not penalized for their actions.256
This also raises the issue of whether YouTube took this time off to
test its system or rather to attract more users to its website. The year 2007
was a very important one for YouTube.257 It was the year after Google
purchased the company, the year when it officially launched in nine countries, and the year that its Partner Program258 was launched.259 Hence,
YouTube was surely determined to increase the amount of its users during
this time. As a result, it is a fair suggestion that YouTube may have somewhat relaxed its already loose standards of fighting against copyright infringement in an attempt to achieve this goal. Additionally, the fact that it
concealed the policy from the public reinforces this argument. If YouTube
really needed the six months to test its program, it should have informed
copyright owners, so that they could increase their content-monitoring efforts during that time. However, YouTube cleverly chose not to do so.
Furthermore, it is important to examine YouTube’s ongoing policy of
assigning “strikes” solely when a copyright owner submits a DMCA takedown notice, but not when its fingerprinting tool identifies a video as infringing.260 In the opinion, the court held that YouTube’s assignment of
strikes exclusively upon the copyright owner’s request that a video be removed was not in violation of § 512(i)(1)(A).261 The court supported its
decision by referring to the Veoh court’s statement that the Audible Magic
filter “does not meet the standard of reliability and verifiability required . . .
to justify terminating a user’s account.”262 However, the Veoh case is
clearly distinguishable from the Viacom case on these grounds as well. In
Veoh, the plaintiff alleged that the service provider’s policy was “inade255. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
256. See generally Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514.
257. YouTube Facts & Figures (History & Statistics), WEBSITE MONITORING BLOG,
http://www.website-monitoring.com/blog/2010/05/17/youtube-facts-and-figures-history-statistics
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
258. A program where copyright owners could become “partners” with YouTube by sharing revenue from relevant in-video ads, and banner ads running next to videos owned by the
copyright owner. See Benefits & Qualifications, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/t/partnerships_benefits (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
259. YouTube Facts & Figures (History & Statistics), supra note 257.
260. A Guide to YouTube Removals, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
http://www.eff.org/issues/intellectual-property/guide-to-youtube-removals (last visited Jan. 10,
2011); see also Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
261. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528; 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
262. Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
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quate because it does not automatically terminate users who upload videos
that are blocked by the Audible Magic filter.”263 However, Viacom did not
argue that YouTube should terminate users when an uploaded video is
identified under the fingerprinting tool; rather, it argued that users should
simply be assigned one of the three strikes allowed prior to termination.264
Taking into consideration the fact that YouTube’s users could always appeal a strike,265 Viacom’s request was clearly not as demanding as the
plaintiff’s request in Veoh. Therefore, although Audible Magic may not be
reliable enough to automatically terminate a user’s account, it is reliable
enough to serve as the basis for an assignment of a single strike to a suspected infringer.
Another issue that was not touched upon by the court was whether
YouTube’s fingerprinting technology is really a part of a “reasonably implemented” policy against repeat infringers as required by
§ 512(i)(1)(A),266 or whether this technology is simply a marketing tool for
YouTube. Both Audible Magic and YouTube’s Content ID technology allow copyright owners to determine, in advance, what happens to potentially
infringing videos detected by the programs.267 Copyright owners can elect
to track their videos, block access to them, or monetize (i.e., allow YouTube to place ads around the videos, or within them, and get a portion of
the revenues).268 Since the blocking or tracking of videos leaves copyright
owners with no compensation for the unauthorized use of their content,
they are often indirectly pressured to choose the latter option.269 This pressure to monetize content conveniently allows YouTube to enjoy increased
profits, since all profits derived from advertisements by the copyright owners are also shared with YouTube.270
Conversely, if a copyright owner chooses not to monetize, but to
block access and remove potentially infringing videos, the uploader is always given the option of disputing a removal.271 This will require the
copyright owner to act by either individually suing the infringer, which
263. Id. (emphasis added).
264. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
265. See A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 260.
266. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
267. Technology Overview, supra note 249; Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 251.
268. Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 251.
269. See Brian Stelter, Now Playing on YouTube: Clips With Ads on the Side, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2008, at C1 [hereinafter Clips With Ads] (“CBS, Universal Music, Lionsgate, Electronic
Arts, and other companies have stopped prodding YouTube to remove unauthorized clips of their
movies, music videos and other content and started selling advertising against them.”).
270. See Benefits & Qualifications, supra note 258.
271. A Guide to YouTube Removals, supra note 260.
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never happens,272 or submitting a DMCA takedown proposal resulting in a
strike against the user.273 Thus, despite the fact that YouTube advertises its
fingerprinting technology as a tool to automatically fight infringement,274
the burden to act ends up ultimately falling on the copyright owner. Consequently, YouTube’s fingerprinting technology seems to be less of an
element of the reasonably implemented repeat-infringer policy required by
§ 512(i)(1)(A),275 and more of a novel scheme to generate profits.
6. Viacom Should Not Be Required to Identify Every Infringing Video on
the YouTube Website in Order to Have Infringing Content Removed.
In 2007, Viacom submitted a takedown notice to YouTube identifying
more than 100,000 infringing videos, and asked YouTube to treat it as a
representative list of the videos that should be taken down from its website.276 However, YouTube did not agree to use the list as a representative
sample, and insisted that it would only take down videos for which Viacom
specified a direct Internet address (“URL”).277 The Viacom court approved
YouTube’s actions, rejecting Viacom’s argument that YouTube must remove other videos that infringe the same works specified in the representative list, even when a specific address for them is not provided.278
Section 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides that a DMCA notification of infringement must include an “[i]dentification of the copyrighted work
claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of
such works at that site.”279 In other words, “it is not necessary for a compliant notification to list every musical composition or sound recording that
has been . . . infringed at that site, so long as a representative list of those
compositions or recordings is provided so that the service provider can understand the nature and scope of the infringement being claimed.”280
Nonetheless, the Viacom court held that construing the “representative list” reference to mean a “merely generic description” without giving
272. Id. (“[N]o typical YouTube user has ever been sued by a major entertainment industry company for uploading a video.”).
273. Id.
274. See generally Audio ID and Video ID, supra note 251.
275. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
276. Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 50.
277. Id.
278. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29.
279. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
280. S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 46 (1998).
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the specific location of the video would “eviscerate the required specificity
of notice” that the court felt was needed.281 The court also added that
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which requires that the identification of an infringing
material be accompanied by “information reasonably sufficient to permit
the service provider to locate the material,”282 was further proof that
DMCA notices required specificity.283 Lastly, the court felt that holding
otherwise would subject the provider “to the factual search forbidden by
§ 512(m)” of the Act.284
Once again, the court erroneously decided the issue. First, as evidenced by the language of § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii), which specifically allows for
a “representative list,” it is clear that the provision was enacted to provide
for situations where there was mass infringement within a site making it
impracticable for a copyright owner to identify each and every specific instance of infringement in a DMCA takedown notice.285 As the Fourth Circuit noted in ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.,286 the “notification requirements are relaxed to the extent that, with respect to multiple
works, not all must be identified—only a ‘representative’ list.”287 The
same court also recognized that § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) “does not seek to burden
copyright holders with the responsibility of identifying every infringing
work—or even most of them—when multiple copyrights are involved,” but
is actually there “to reduce the burden of holders of multiple copyrights
who face extensive infringement of their works.”288 Therefore, since it
seems undisputed that Viacom faces “extensive infringement” of its works
because of YouTube, the court should have decided in favor of Viacom and
held that Viacom did not have to provide the specific location of every unauthorized video. The language in § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which the court also
referred to,289 further supports this idea by providing that the copyright
owner need only provide “information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to locate” the infringing material.290
The court’s decision to approve YouTube’s actions is also contrary to
public policy. It would be outrageous to simply place the entire burden on
Viacom to find the exact location of every infringing video on the You281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
Id. at 528–29.
See Viacom’s Memorandum, supra note 206, at 51.
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 625.
Id.
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
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Tube website, when it is YouTube that allows the copyright infringers to
upload unauthorized videos. YouTube could have simply taken the representative list submitted by Viacom, noted the specific videos that were
identified as unauthorized in the takedown notice, and used its excellent
search engine,291 or its fingerprinting technology, to prevent the same infringing videos from being displayed on the site. The availability of a specific web address of every infringing video was clearly not a necessity as
the court suggested.292 To place the burden solely on the copyright owner
to locate and provide the specific web address or specific location of every
infringing video on YouTube’s website would clearly “upset the Congressionally apportioned burden between the copyright holder and the service
provider.”293
Finally, the Viacom court suggested that holding a service provider to
a “factual search” of infringements on its site, prompted by takedown notices, was “forbidden” by § 512(m).294 Section 512(m), titled “Protection
of Privacy,” provides that a service provider need not monitor its service,
or affirmatively seek facts indicating an infringing activity, in order to be
eligible for DMCA protection.295 However, the court improperly construed
the language of the section to also apply in situations when the service provider had been informed of an ongoing infringing activity via a DMCA
takedown notice.296 The court’s interpretation of § 512(m) resulted in the
proposition that the service provider does not have the obligation or the
duty to do anything more than respond to specific takedown notices.297
Essentially, the court assigned the copyright owner the entire burden
of monitoring infringements.298 However, § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii), which states
that a DMCA takedown notice must include “information reasonably suffi291. See generally Joshua Hill, YouTube Surpasses Yahoo as World’s #2 Search Engine,
TGDAILY.COM (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.tgdaily.com/trendwatch-features/39777-youtubesurpasses-yahoo-as-world%E2%80%99s-2-search-engine (identifying YouTube as the secondlargest search engine in the world).
292. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29.
293. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1180 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (holding that the service provider was not allowed to take action only when it was provided
with a specific web page at which a given work is located, because that would “upset the Congressionally apportioned burden between copyright holder and service provider by placing the
entire burden on the copyright owner”).
294. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
295. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
296. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 514.
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cient to permit the service provider to locate the material,”299 implies that
there is some sharing of the burden. The language in this section suggests
that the service provider has the burden to “locate the material,”300 after being provided with a “representative list”301 indicating infringement. Moreover, the legislature specifically stated that “if a service provider becomes
aware of a ‘red flag’ from which infringing activity is apparent, it will lose
the limitation of liability if it takes no action.”302 Thus, although YouTube
may not be required to engage in constant monitoring of its site before any
signs of infringement arise, this changes once it becomes aware of ongoing
infringement. This argument is further supported by the underlying principle that DMCA protection of a service provider disappears “‘at the moment
the service provider loses its innocence, i.e. at the moment it becomes
aware that a third party is using its system to infringe.’”303
IV. THE LEGISLATURE MUST REVISE THE DMCA IN ORDER TO ALLOW
FILE-HOSTING WEBSITES TO EXIST, WHILE GRANTING COPYRIGHT
OWNERS THE PROTECTION TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED
The Viacom court’s holding that YouTube was protected under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA” or “the Act”) stemmed from
flawed reasoning and clear misinterpretation of multiple provisions in
§ 512 of the Act. The court seems to have completely ignored the negative
impact that the decision will likely have on copyright owners. The fault,
however, should not be attributed solely to the Viacom court, but also to the
legislature’s vague drafting of several provisions of the DMCA.304 Although the DMCA may have granted adequate protection to both service
providers and copyright owners when it was initially enacted, this is clearly
not the case anymore. With the rapid increase and popularity of filehosting websites like YouTube, the DMCA in its current state can no
longer provide the proper balance between the need to adequately protect
copyright owners and the need to promote technological innovation.305 As
a result, Congress must amend the DMCA’s outdated provisions, and the
Viacom court’s decision must be reversed on appeal in order to avoid a col299. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).
300. Id.
301. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
302. H.R. REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998) (emphasis added).
303. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (quoting ALS Scan, Inc., 239
F.3d at 625).
304. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2006).
305. See Brett White, Viacom v. YouTube: A Proving Ground for DMCA Safe Harbors
Against Secondary Liability, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 811, 843 (2010).
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lapse of copyright protection.
A. The DMCA’s Ambiguous Provisions
When the legislature drafted the DMCA, it clearly did not consider a
service provider with such a high volume of user-uploaded content like
YouTube.306 This was apparent by the ambiguities in several of the DMCA
provisions, which led the Viacom court to rule in a manner that undoubtedly hurts the rights of copyright owners.307 As a result, the DMCA must
be amended. First and foremost, the legislature must amend the DMCA so
that judges know how to deal with the issue of whether service providers
such as YouTube need only respond to specific instances of infringement.
As already explained, it is imperative that the legislature explicitly require
the service provider to remove infringing content from its servers regardless of whether it is informed of specific instances of infringement, or
whether it obtains general knowledge of infringement through circumstantial evidence. Additionally, the legislature must explicitly state that service
providers that are willfully blind to ongoing infringements will not be entitled to DMCA safe harbor protection. Although § 512 provides that service
providers who have circumstantial knowledge of infringement would not
be entitled to DMCA protection,308 the Viacom decision clearly shows that
judges can simply ignore the provision.
Arguably, increasing the burden on service providers may not be allowed under § 512(m). Therefore, the legislature should also amend the
DMCA to explicitly place some of the burden of monitoring infringement
on the service provider. Although it may have been unfair to impose such
burden when the DMCA was first drafted, times have clearly changed.
File-hosting websites now enjoy a large amount of revenue that is derived
from videos uploaded onto their websites,309 and therefore, they should be
required to face at least some of the burden of policing their own servers.
A burden imposed solely on the copyright owner in modern times would be
unreasonable since the number of websites like YouTube continues to increase rapidly,310 meaning the copyright owner could potentially go bankrupt
306. See also id. at 843 (“When drafting the DMCA, the legislature was clearly not considering a service provider with such a high volume of user-uploaded content as YouTube.”). See
generally S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 1–6 (1998).
307. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
308. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
309. See generally File Hosting Service, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_hosting_service (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
310. Top 22 Sites Similar to YouTube, ISOFTWAREREVIEWS.COM,
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if it has to spend the time and money monitoring every one of these sites.
This, however, was not a big concern when the DMCA was initially drafted,
because video hosting websites were almost non-existent at that time.311
Furthermore, § 512(c)(1)(B) also contains many ambiguities, which
result in courts reaching opposite conclusions in cases involving similar
facts. This section provides that a service provider will not be entitled to
safe harbor protection when it has the right and ability to control infringements and derives revenue directly attributable to these infringements.312
However, the DMCA does not clearly define when a service provider is
“able” to control infringement, and when its profits are considered “directly
attributable” to infringement.313 This ambiguity allows courts to subjectively define these terms in a way that best “fits” their ultimate holding.
For example, in the Viacom litigation, the court held the right and ability to
control infringements also included a knowledge element.314 This decision
clearly fit the court’s ultimate holding that YouTube was protected under
the DMCA because it was only responsible for dealing with the specific infringements of which it was aware.315
Although the drafters of the DMCA may have intentionally left these
terms ambiguous with the purpose of adapting to changes in technology
paradigms,316 this ambiguity could result in unfair decisions. Therefore, in
order to adequately protect the rights of copyright owners, the legislature
should make it clear that when a service provider has the tools to search
and locate infringing content, filter infringing content as it is uploaded onto
its servers (e.g. by using fingerprinting technology), and has the ability to
terminate user accounts, it has the right and ability to control the infringing
activity. Moreover, the legislature should make clear that when a service
provider enjoys the commercialization of content posted on its site, and a
large portion of that content is unauthorized, the profits derived will be categorized as “directly attributable” to infringements. After all, it is clear
that when a large amount of unauthorized content attracts users to a website, and that website’s advertisement-based revenue is almost entirely dependent on the number of its visitors, that revenue is “directly attributable”
to the infringements.
Finally, the legislature also left § 512(i)(1)(A) ambiguous. This section
http://www.isoftwarereviews.com/sites-similar-to-youtube (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
311. See generally File Sharing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_sharing
(last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
312. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
313. See id.
314. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
315. See id. at 525.
316. Dissecting DMCA § 512, supra note 119.
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provides that a service provider must adopt a repeat-infringer policy that terminates users who infringe on multiple occasions.317 In an attempt to give
courts discretion when analyzing service providers’ repeat-infringer policies,
the legislature simply provided that these policies must be “reasonably implemented.”318 This provision once again demonstrates the legislature’s lack
of guidance.319 Although it may be reasonable to leave policy decisions up
to the service providers’ discretion,320 this freedom should not be limitless
allowing service providers to take advantage of it. As explained above, because service providers, like YouTube, derive profits from unauthorized use
of copyrighted content on their servers, they may intentionally hesitate to
terminate the user accounts of repeat-infringers.321 This was most likely the
case with YouTube. The Viacom court felt that YouTube’s repeat-infringer
policy was “reasonable,”322 despite the fact that repeat infringers who submitted hundreds of unauthorized videos did not necessarily lose their account.323 The legislature should not allow for such outcomes by leaving the
provision ambiguous. For example, the legislature could add a provision to
§ 512(i)(1)(A) clearly defining the term “repeat infringer.” This clarity would
allow courts to reach accurate decisions when they are left to determine
whether a certain repeat-infringer policy is “reasonable.”
B. The Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act
Although the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act
(“COICA”)324 was introduced on September 20, 2010 to help fight copyright infringement,325 the proposed act may be too aggressive and could potentially lead to an undesirable outcome.326 The COICA will require “In317. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
318. Id. (emphasis added).
319. See supra Part III.B.2.
320. See White, supra note 305, at 823 (stating that the Ninth Circuit held that implementation of § 512 policy is left to the service providers who must develop a system for dealing with
DCMA complaint notifications).
321. See supra Part III.B.5.
322. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
323. See id. (“[M]ultiple take-down notices identifying videos uploaded by the user received by YouTube within a two-hour period [did] not mean that the policy was not ‘reasonably
implemented’ as required by § 512(i)(1)(A).”).
324. Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. (2010).
325. See generally COICA Fact Sheet, DEMANDPROGRESS.ORG,
http://demandprogress.org/blacklist/coica (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
326. See Natch Greyes, COICA: A Potential Shift In Intellectual Property Law,
MARSHALL-WYTHE STUDENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SOCIETY (Sept. 29, 2010),
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ternet service providers, financial transaction providers, and online ad vendors” to disconnect all ties with websites listed on a “blacklist” created by
the Attorney General.327 The list will include websites that are “dedicated
to infringing activities” and where counterfeit goods or copyrighted materials are “central” to the websites’ activity.328 Due to the broad scope of the
COICA,329 it is feared that if enacted, and the Viacom case is overturned on
appeal, YouTube may be one of the sites that are placed on this blacklist.330
Moreover, even if the Viacom decision is affirmed, YouTube may still be
placed on the blacklist if it is determined that its users are using the website
for the purpose of copyright infringement.331
While the COICA demonstrates Congress’ intent to fight infringement, it could threaten the existence of websites such as YouTube, and may
not be the appropriate way to solve the problem of online copyright infringement.332 While the DMCA allows websites to exist so long as they
counter infringement, the COICA provides for the ban of entire websites if
it is determined that they host a significant amount of unauthorized content.333 As a result, it is “not just possible but probable that a great deal of
legitimate, protected speech will be taken down in the name of copyright
enforcement.”334 This could certainly pose a threat to websites like YouTube, which host both infringing and non-infringing content.335 It seems
unfair to ban a website because some users choose to illegally transmit
copyrighted content. Innocent Internet users who do not engage in Internet
piracy, and companies who voluntarily choose to place their copyrighted
videos on websites like YouTube, should not have to suffer the negative
consequence of having these websites banned as a result of the COICA.336
http://sips.blogs.wm.edu/2010/09/29/coica-a-potential-shift-in-intellectual-property-law (explaining that the COICA may be too broad, could “override existing precedent regarding the provisions of the [DMCA],” and could lead to “massive expansion of U.S. jurisdictional power”).
327. COICA Fact Sheet, supra note 325.
328. Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act § 2.
329. Greyes, supra note 326 (“The real problem . . . is the broad scope of COICA.”).
330. COICA Fact Sheet, supra note 325.
331. Id.
332. See id. (stating that if the bill passes, Viacom does not need to prove YouTube is doing anything illegal as long as it can convince a court that enough people are using YouTube for
copyright infringement).
333. Richard Esguerra, Censorship of the Internet Takes Center Stage in “Online Infringement” Bill, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/censorship-internet-takes-center-stage-online.
334. Id.
335. Brian Stelter, Those Funny YouTube Videos Are Pulling in Serious Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at A1 (providing examples of individuals who have profited by making
YouTube videos).
336. See Clips With Ads, supra note 269, at C1 (noting that only some videos uploaded
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Therefore, rather than enacting an aggressive act such as the COICA,
amending the ambiguous DMCA provisions would be more beneficial in
the efforts to combat copyright infringement.337 The legislature may have
intended to leave certain provisions of the DMCA ambiguous in order to
facilitate the development of innovative technology.338 However, this goal
should not be achieved at the expense of copyright owners’ rights.339 As
Viacom shows, statutory ambiguities not only lead to inconsistent court decisions,340 but also to unfair and erroneous holdings.341
V. CONCLUSION
Viacom is clearly one of the most important copyright cases in recent decades.342 It illuminates the tension between the need for tools that
facilitate the exchange and sharing of ideas and the need to protect copyright owners. However, the court’s decision in Viacom seems to favor the
needs of service providers more than the needs of the copyright owners.343
This results in an imbalance between these equally important interests.344
Due to the numerous ambiguities in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA” or “the Act”), the Viacom court ruled that the Act provided a defense for YouTube against all of Viacom’s claims.345 This ruling was erroneous and should be reversed on appeal.
The Viacom decision was erroneous for several reasons. First, YouTube should not have been shielded from liability under the DMCA because it was willfully blind to ongoing infringement.346 Although the Viaonto YouTube violate copyright laws, and that copyright owners such as Lionsgate have begun
to work with YouTube by placing ads surrounding their copyrighted content).
337. See Dissecting DMCA § 512, supra note 119 (identifying ambiguous terms in the
statute).
338. See id. See generally S. REP. NO. 105–190, at 1–2 (1998).
339. See supra Part III.B.
340. See supra Part III.B.1.
341. See supra Part III.B.
342. See Fulton, supra note 167 (classifying Viacom as a “landmark” case and stating that
it will “likely determine the future of the online video sharing industry at least, and the Internet
media economy at most”).
343. See generally Zebrak, supra note 189 (stating that the recent decision in Viacom v.
YouTube has upset the balance between service providers and copyright holders in favor of service providers).
344. See id. (stating that the recent decision in Viacom v. YouTube has upset the balance
between service providers and copyright holders in favor of service providers).
345. See Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(granting summary judgment to YouTube against all claims filed by Viacom).
346. See id. at 525 (holding that the “[g]eneral knowledge that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’
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com court suggested that YouTube need only counter infringement when it
is specifically made aware of it,347 the court should have imposed upon
YouTube the duty to block access to infringing videos regardless of how
YouTube came to learn of them.348 Second, YouTube’s lack of knowledge
of specific and identifiable infringements did not mean that it lacked the
right and ability to control infringing activity or that it did not derive financial benefit directly from infringement.349 Such knowledge is not required,350 and the evidence clearly showed that YouTube had both the
means to control the infringing activity and to earn revenue directly attributable to infringement using its website.351 Third, the court should have
given more deference to previous cases concerning P2P networks because
they were applicable to the case.352 Fourth, YouTube should not have been
shielded by § 512(c) because it is not a passive storage provider, but rather
an entertainment website that uses stored content to derive profits.353 Fifth,
the court should not have found that YouTube’s repeat-infringer policy was
“reasonable” as required by the DMCA, because the policy was too lenient
on repeat-infringers.354 Finally, the court should not have disregarded the
provision allowing Viacom to submit a “representative list” of infringing

does not impose a duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements.”).
347. Id.
348. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii–iii) (2006) (specifying that if an infringement is apparent in light of the facts or circumstances surrounding the infringement, the service provider
must quickly remove or disable the infringing material).
349. See supra Part III.B.2.
350. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (stating that a defendant who had the “right and ability to supervise the infringing activity” would be liable for infringement even if it “has no actual knowledge” of it); see
also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 n.9 (2005)
(“[V]icarious liability . . . allows imposition of liability . . . even if the defendant initially lacks
knowledge of the infringement.”).
351. See Zebrak, supra note 189 (explaining that Viacom had submitted evidence to the
court that YouTube “had not only general awareness of the infringing activity but also awareness
of specific infringing clips”).
352. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (holding that case law involving P2P
networks has “little application” to the case). But see Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No.
CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 6355911, at *15–16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (suggesting
that distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing programs can seek protection under § 512(d)’s safeharbor for information-location tools).
353. See supra Part III.B.4.
354. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527–28 (approving YouTube’s repeatinfringer policy). But see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (“The limitations on liability established by this
section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably
implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and
account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.”).
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works to YouTube.355 Once YouTube became aware of infringing works
via Viacom’s “representative list,” it should have been required to take
down other identical infringing works that were not on this list.356
The Viacom decision demonstrates a need for an overhaul of contemporary copyright law.357 Currently, the DMCA might benefit companies
like YouTube, which rely on others’ content to foster their own growth;
however, it does not adequately protect copyright owners.358 While amending the DMCA seems necessary after the Viacom decision, the Act needs to
be preserved in order to shield online service providers from liability when
they make reasonable efforts to counter infringement.359 After all, without
the DMCA, websites like YouTube would not exist.360 While this may be
desirable to companies like Viacom, such an outcome would harm a great
deal of businesses and individuals that choose to generate profit from YouTube.361 Moreover, such an outcome would negatively impact many noninfringers who simply use YouTube as a means to share business presentations, tutorials, and family videos. The ability of individuals to share such
content with others is surely desirable in modern society.
Therefore, while there is a need to reverse the Viacom decision on appeal in order to impose a larger burden on YouTube to counter infringement, the higher court must act carefully so that its decision does not lead
to the demise of YouTube.362 Further, it is necessary that the legislature
355. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29 (rejecting Viacom’s argument that
it should be able to submit a representative list to YouTube).
356. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“[Section 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)] . . . does not seek to burden copyright holders with the responsibility
of identifying every infringing work—or even most of them—when multiple copyrights are involved.”).
357. See Zebrak, supra note 189 (stating that the district court’s decision in Viacom v.
YouTube upsets the legislative intent behind DMCA, and thus dissuades service providers from
fighting against copyright infringement).
358. See supra Part III.B.
359. See Kurt Opsahl, YouTube Wins Summary Judgment in Viacom DMCA Lawsuit,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (June 23, 2010),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/06/youtube-wins-summary-judgment-viacom-dmca (arguing
that the DMCA gives strong incentives to service providers to remove copyright infringed material upon notice by shielding them from copyright infringement liability if they comply).
360. Id. (“Without the DMCA safe harbors, sites like YouTube . . . simply wouldn’t exist.”).
361. See Clips With Ads, supra note 269, at C1 (“CBS, Universal Music, Lionsgate, Electronic Arts, and other companies have stopped prodding YouTube to remove unauthorized clips
of their movies, music videos and other content and started selling advertising against them.”);
see also Stelter, supra note 335, at A1 (giving examples of individuals who have profited by making YouTube videos).
362. See supra Part IV.B.
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amend the DMCA in order to enable copyright owners and other webcontent providers to happily co-exist in this era of constant technological
innovation.
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